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Abstract 
 John Dewey was an American philosopher, psychologist, and leading figure in the 
progressive education movement that took place in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. While many are familiar with Dewey’s educational philosophy and its aim to 
promote and improve America’s democratic experience, few are familiar with the integral 
role that Dewey’s philosophy of history played in his perceived need for a reconstruction in 
and of philosophy, in the development of his philosophy of education, and in the 
implementation of his philosophy of education at the Laboratory School. The focus of this 
thesis centers on this gap in our understanding of Dewey’s philosophy of history and its 
implementation at the Laboratory School. Through a four-fold inquiry, I argue that at the 
heart of Dewey’s approach to philosophy and education lay an intelligent understanding of 
past human growth, progress, and intellectual development with an overarching emphasis on 
knowledge as an experimental, experiential, and reconstructive process rather than as a 
product. This paper examines Dewey’s unique history of philosophy, the development of his 
philosophy of history, the application of his ideas at the Laboratory School, and the trajectory 
of his philosophies of history and education over the last one hundred years. 
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Introduction 
 John Dewey was an American philosopher, psychologist, and educational reformer 
during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. He made a monumental impact on these fields 
by reconstructing “modern” philosophy, contributing to the science of psychology, and 
emphasizing progressive educational reform during his 92-year lifetime (1859-1952). His 
contributions to these disciplines have endured well into the twenty-first century. Much has 
been written on Dewey’s pragmatism, functional psychology, social theory, and topics such 
as art, logic, and ethics; however, he is best known for his publications about education. 
 Those aware of Dewey’s educational writings are likely familiar with his role at the 
Laboratory School at the University of Chicago from 1896-1903 where Dewey and his 
colleagues developed, tested, and perfected their psychological and educational theories. 
They are also likely familiar with Dewey’s well-known texts, such as The School and Society 
and Democracy and Education, which, according to the John Dewey Project on Progressive 
Education, emphasized “the development of critical, socially engaged intelligence, which 
enables individuals to understand and participate effectively in the affairs of their community 
in a collaborative effort to achieve a common good.”1 Dewey’s advocacy of democracy and 
democratic education were aimed at ensuring the existence of an informed, critical, and 
socially adept populace, which was just as vitally important in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries as it is today. During that time, the novel realities of an industrial and 
scientific age resulted in a need for new ways of thinking, learning, and living that were 
capable of promoting individual and collective progress in the face of unprecedented change. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 John Dewey Project on Progressive Education, A Brief Overview of Progressive Education, University of 
Vermont, Burlington, VT. 
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 While many are familiar with Dewey’s educational philosophy and its aim to promote 
and improve America’s democratic experience, few are familiar with the integral role that 
Dewey’s philosophy of history played in his perceived need for a reconstruction in and of 
philosophy, in the development of his philosophy of education, and in the implementation of 
his philosophy of education at the Laboratory School. The focus of this thesis centers on this 
gap in our understanding of Dewey’s philosophy of history and its implementation at the 
Laboratory School. Through a four-fold inquiry, I argue that at the heart of Dewey’s 
approach to philosophy and education lay an intelligent understanding of past human growth, 
progress, and intellectual development with an overarching emphasis on knowledge as an 
experimental, experiential, and reconstructive process rather than as a product. This paper 
examines Dewey’s unique history of philosophy, the development of his philosophy of 
history, the application of his ideas at the Laboratory School, and the trajectory of his 
philosophies of history and education over the last one hundred years. 
 Following a brief section on Dewey’s intellectual formation and a longer section on 
Dewey’s account of the history of philosophy, the third section is intended to be an in-depth 
inquiry into the development of Dewey’s philosophy of history, which stemmed from 
Dewey’s inquiry into the history of philosophy itself. This resulted in Dewey calling for a 
reconstruction in and of modern philosophy in a direction away from the realms of natural 
philosophy, metaphysical inquiry, and absolute truths, and rather towards a systematic, 
scientific, and historical inquiry into the human condition and human morals with the intent 
of serving as a philosophical compass allowing for humankind to enrich and perfect its 
experience in an industrial and scientific age when what Dewey calls “pre-scientific morals” 
were still the norm.  
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 The fourth section will examine the implementation of Dewey’s pragmatic and 
somewhat linear historicism at the Laboratory School. Dewey’s philosophy of history paired 
with an emphasis on inquiry, growth, and repeating the race experience served as the 
foundation of the Laboratory School’s curriculum. While it is popularly argued that Dewey 
was antagonistic to the discipline of history due to his refusal to accept static historical truths, 
Dewey’s pragmatic historicism was in actuality the ideal means of embracing historical 
uncertainty as a means of better understanding the present and ensuring that uncertain 
experiences—such as the democratic experience itself—were continually enriched and 
perfected through the refusal to accept static, unchanging ideals.    
 The last section will examine the trajectory and fate of Dewey’s philosophy of history 
and his educational philosophy in the years following their experimental implementation at 
the Laboratory School. In the decades following the Laboratory School experiment, the 
historical uncertainty embraced by Dewey could simply not be accepted in a world that 
wanted static truths in a time of political, economic, and social uncertainty. While Dewey did 
embrace historical uncertainty, there are in fact a number of fundamental Deweyan 
philosophical and educational truths that are still researched, admired, and utilized—while 
maybe not overtly, and to varying degrees—in the realms of twentieth and twenty-first 
century curricular and pedagogical design. 
 In terms of research, while scholarly interpretations of John Dewey’s life and works 
played a vital role in informing my arguments, this thesis draws primarily from Dewey’s 
published works. Dewey’s “From Absolutism to Experimentalism” provided a great deal of 
valuable insight regarding Dewey’s intellectual formation. An understanding of Dewey’s 
intellectual formation is vital for an understanding of Dewey’s passion for education, 
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emerging philosophical interests, and the fundamental role that an intelligent understanding 
of the past played in Dewey’s perceived need for reconstruction in and of philosophy.  
 In terms of analyzing Dewey’s history of philosophy and the way in which it reveals 
his philosophy of history, Reconstruction in Philosophy and Logic: The Theory of Inquiry 
were two major works that outline Dewey’s pragmatic and somewhat linear historicism that 
when coupled with logical and systematic inquiry could harness an intelligent understanding 
of the past for intelligent human action in the present. Phillip Deen, historian and scholar of 
Dewey, provided additional clarifying insights that informed this thesis’s arguments relating 
to Dewey’s perceived need for a reconstruction in and of philosophy away from the more 
traditional philosophies of the past and rather towards a more pragmatic, modern philosophy 
that could serve as a moral human science. 
 Research into the application of Dewey’s philosophy of history and philosophy of 
education focused primarily on The Dewey School: The Laboratory School of the University 
of Chicago 1896-1903 by Katherine Camp Mayhew and Anna Camp Edwards. With 
Mayhew having served as the former vice-principal also in charge of curriculum 
development at the Laboratory School, and with Edwards having served as a teacher of 
history, The Dewey School provided many valuable insights into the workings of the 
Laboratory School and specifically how the school implemented its approach to teaching 
history. The portion of this thesis dedicated to analyzing the implementation of Dewey’s 
philosophy of history at the Laboratory School was also aided tremendously by Thomas 
Fallace’s work on Dewey’s approach to history education and the historical method. 
 Another source that proved useful for both the application of Dewey’s philosophy of 
history at the Laboratory School and for Dewey’s enduring impact was John Dewey’s 
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Philosophy of Education: An Introduction and a Recontextualization for our Times by Jim 
Garrison, Stefan Neubert, and Kersten Reich. The concise yet thorough nature of this 
recently published work provided insights into the purpose and nature of the Dewey School, 
lessons for the present, and the hermeneutic challenge that Dewey’s holistic philosophical 
works present to readers. 
 Overall, the research process affirmed what Garrison, Neubert, and Reich called the 
“hermeneutic challenge” of Dewey’s works, meaning that readers “must grasp all of him to 
properly understand the parts, and yet must grasp the parts to comprehend the whole.”2 This 
thesis argues that the “part” of Dewey lacking common understanding amongst his readers is 
his philosophy of history and the vital role that it played in Dewey’s educational aims and 
curricular design at the Laboratory School. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Garrison, Jim, Stefan Neubert, and Kersten Reich, John Dewey’s Philosophy of Education: An Introduction 
and Recontextualization for our Times (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), x. 
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Intellectual Formation 
 A brief overview of John Dewey’s intellectual formation is vital to understanding 
how and why Dewey became interested in philosophy, psychology, and education in the first 
place, as well as how his views in these three areas changed over time. Dewey’s story began 
in 1859 when he was born in Burlington, Vermont to Archibald Dewey and Lucina Artemisia 
Rich Dewey. 3  After attending Burlington Public Schools until the young age of fifteen years 
old, Dewey enrolled at the University of Vermont in 1875 and graduated with a bachelor’s 
degree four years later.4 
 It was at the University of Vermont that Dewey was introduced to new ways of 
thinking that had a significant impact on his intellectual formation. Upon taking a physiology 
course with an assigned reading of Darwinian T.H. Huxley, Dewey writes that “It is difficult 
to speak with exactitude about what happened to me intellectually so many years ago, but I 
have an impression that there was derived from that study a sense of interdependence and 
interrelated unity that gave form to intellectual stirrings that had been previously inchoate.”5 
The intellectual stirrings prompted by Darwinian thought were contributory in the sense of 
turning Dewey’s thinking towards the organic and unified as well as towards the 
interdependent relationship between an organism and environment. Dewey further explains 
that as a result of reading Huxley, he received “great stimulation from the study, more than 
from anything I had had contact with before; and as no desire was awaked in me to continue 
that particular branch of learning, I date from this time the awakening of a distinctive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Jay Martin, Education of John Dewey, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 5. 
4 Ibid., 37. 
5 John Dewey, "From Absolutism to Experimentalism," in George P. Adams and Wm. Pepperell Montague 
(eds). Contemporary American Philosophy: Personal Statements Russell and Russell (1930): 13. 
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philosophic interest.”6 So while Dewey did not pursue the study of physiology or 
evolutionary biology, the philosophical ramifications of living in a Darwinian age peaked 
Dewey’s philosophic interests—so much so that Dewey later wrote an essay titled “The 
Influence of Darwin on Philosophy” and discussed in numerous contexts the influence of 
Darwin upon philosophic thought and life in a scientific age.     
 While Huxley’s work awoke a philosophic interest in him, it would remain relatively 
latent while he taught high school for several years (two years in Oil City, Pennsylvania and 
one year in Charlotte, Vermont). It was during his third year of teaching back in Vermont 
that Dewey studied privately with his former teacher of philosophy, H.A.P. Torrey. In 
Dewey’s reflection upon the time spent with Torrey, he writes: 
He was an excellent teacher, and I owe him a double debt, that of turning my thoughts 
definitely to the study of philosophy as a life-pursuit, and of a generous gift of time to 
me during a year devoted privately under his direction to a reading of classics in the 
history of philosophy and learning to read philosophic German.7 
 
The importance of Dewey’s exposure to the history of philosophy while under the guidance 
of Torrey should not be overlooked, as it was not only what encouraged Dewey to embark 
upon the study of philosophy as a life-long pursuit, but it was also the exposure that 
prompted Dewey to simultaneously develop his own history of philosophy and philosophy of 
history (which will be expounded upon in the following section). It is also worth noting that 
while teaching, and during Dewey’s private study with Torrey, W.T. Harris, editor of the 
Journal of Speculative Philosophy, published several of Dewey’s articles in the only journal 
at the time dedicated to the study of philosophy for non-theological reasons. Dewey writes: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 John Dewey, "From Absolutism to Experimentalism," 13.	  
7 Ibid., 14-15. 
	   10 
“His (Harris’s) reply was so encouraging that it was a distinct factor in deciding me to try 
philosophy as a professional career.”8  
 With Dewey’s decision made to pursue philosophy as a profession, his next step was 
applying for a graduate program in philosophy at Johns Hopkins University. While attending 
Johns Hopkins, Dewey was influenced by several individuals: G. Stanley Hall, whose 
specialty was child psychology and whose experimental psychology revealed to Dewey the 
power of the scientific method when applied to the social/human science; Charles Sanders 
Peirce, who is considered by most as the originator of philosophical pragmatism (though 
James was the first to use the word in print in 1898)9; and George Sylvester Morris, whose 
Hegelian organic unity appealed to Dewey. While Hall and Peirce undoubtedly had an 
impact on Dewey’s intellectual formation, Dewey reflects most upon his time spent with 
Morris and his subsequent exposure to Hegelianism. In regard to Dewey’s time at Johns 
Hopkins and his time spend with Morris, Dewey wrote the following: 
My earlier philosophic study had been an intellectual gymnastic. Hegel’s synthesis to 
subject and object, matter and spirit, the divine and the human, was, however, no 
mere intellectual formula; it operated as an immense release, a liberation. Hegel’s 
treatment of human culture, of institutions and the arts, involved the same dissolution 
of hard-and-fast dividing walls, and had a special attraction for me.10 
 
This “dissolution of hard-and-fast dividing walls” played a significant role in Dewey’s 
organic view of both philosophy and history, and while Dewey was only a Hegelian early in 
his career, he would remain a dialectical thinker. 
 Outside of the collegiate setting, the influence of Jane Addams and the Hull-House on 
John Dewey is also fairly well known. Jane Addams and Ellen Gates Starr founded the Hull- 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Ibid., 16.	  
9 William James, “Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results,” University Chronicle (September 1898): 
287-310. 
10 John Dewey, "From Absolutism to Experimentalism," 19. 
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House in 1889 to serve as a social settlement that provided social and educational services 
for the growing number of “new immigrants” entering Chicago from Southern and Eastern 
Europe.11 The Hull-House was social in nature and its largely-immigrant learning community 
hinged on “learning from life itself,” which served as “a narrative reconstruction of 
experiential learning, through which past experiences may be integrated with present social 
realities.”12 The experiential, adaptive, and pragmatic nature of education at the Hull-House 
appealed to Dewey who visited frequently, lectured occasionally, and eventually served on 
the settlement’s Board of Trustees.13 While spending time at the Hull-House, Dewey 
experienced its emphasis on experiential learning rooted in present realities, and the Hull-
House may have, in some ways, served as inspiration and as a testing ground for Dewey’s 
theories on a comprehensive public education with social and democratic aims.  
 Several other instances of intellectual influence are worth noting, such as Dewey’s 
ten years at the University of Michigan and the influence of sociologist George Herbert 
Mead, who turned Dewey’s focus to the social nature of the mind and of the self. Dewey’s 
wife, Alice Chipman Dewey, whom he married in 1886, also shaped Dewey’s thinking. Alice 
was a progressive-minded woman who influenced Dewey’s thought in regard to social justice 
and societal issues, and some even suggest that the process of having and raising children 
influenced Dewey’s receptivity and interest in the psychology of young learners.  
 In terms of psychology, Dewey notes the vital influence of William James upon his 
philosophical thought, and he writes that William James’s The Principles of Psychology were 
“one specifiable philosophic factor which entered into my thinking so as to give it a new 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Bridget K. O’Rourke, “To Learn From Life Itself: Experience and Education at the Hull-House,” in Jane 
Addams in the Classroom, ed. David Schaafsma (Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2014), 32. 
12 Ibid., 34.	  
13 Ibid., 35. 
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direction and quality.”14 This direction and quality, while not the subject of this essay, were 
the objective and biological factors in James’s thought that progressively worked their way 
into Dewey’s ideas and, as Dewey writes, “acted as a ferment to transform old beliefs.”15  
 Dewey’s old psychological and philosophical beliefs would be transformed at the 
University of Chicago where Dewey accepted a position as the head of the department of 
philosophy, psychology, and pedagogy in 1894. It was at the University of Chicago that 
Dewey began to consider his philosophy of education and his philosophical theories in an 
increasingly systematic and experimental way as he had done, and would continue to do, 
with his philosophy of history.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 John Dewey, "From Absolutism to Experimentalism," 23. 
15 Ibid., 24.	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History of Philosophy 
 In order to understand Dewey’s philosophy of history, one must first understand 
Dewey’s history of philosophy. As previously noted, Dewey’s inquiry into the history of 
philosophy while studying privately with H.A.P. Torrey was what initially whetted Dewey’s 
appetite for a profession in philosophy. Dewey’s exposure to Darwinian thinking as an 
undergrad, the somewhat evolutionary progression of the history of philosophy, and Dewey’s 
dialectical and pragmatic tendencies all played a vital role in the construction of a unique 
Deweyan history of philosophy that subsequently reveals Dewey’s pragmatic and linear 
historicism.  
 Dewey’s history of philosophy is practical and relatively straightforward, but that is 
not to say that is not critical or that it lacks complexity. Phillip Deen, historian and scholar of 
Dewey, writes that Dewey’s history of philosophy “traces the rise of modern philosophy and 
the epistemological problem that forms its core. Ironically, the purpose of this genealogy is to 
show how deeply ‘unmodern’ modern philosophy is.”16 Truly modern philosophy, the one 
called for in Dewey’s Reconstruction in Philosophy, is “one that overcomes the 
epistemological problem of relating subject and object by functionalizing and naturalizing 
the process of knowing.”17 Ultimately, Dewey argued that the “process of knowing” should 
consist of a more pragmatic approach to gaining knowledge through experience and 
experimentation. Abstract metaphysical and epistemological inquiries of ancient, medieval, 
and “unmodern” philosophers were simply insufficient in terms of lacking the particular 
instrumentality needed to meet then-present needs. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Phillip Deen, introduction to Unmodern Philosophy and Modern Philosophy (Illinois: Southern Illinois 
University Press, 2012) XX. 
17 Ibid. 
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 Dewey writes that a necessary precondition for historical judgments—that is, the 
selective judgments made when developing a history of philosophy—is the “recognition of 
change in social states and institutions,” with the particular institution subject to historical 
inquiry being the various systems of philosophy that have existed and evolved for centuries 
and millennia. When examining various systems of thought from the past, Dewey stressed 
that, “even when these strains are woven together into an effort to construct a comprehensive 
strand that covers the movement taken to be relatively complete, the various strains must first 
be segregated and each followed through its course.”18 Dewey’s history of philosophy 
follows this suggested methodology of inquiry, beginning with mythologizing, transitioning 
to the philosophy of ancient Greece, the Medieval Church, and “modern” philosophy, prior to 
expounding upon the inadequacies of modern philosophy and the perceived need for 
reconstruction in and of philosophy. 
 Dewey’s history of philosophy begins with the primitive history of humankind, when 
philosophy as we know it did not exist. The general means of explaining human existence 
was animal tales, myths, and cults. Dewey writes that, “The material out of which philosophy 
finally emerges is irrelevant to science and to explanation. It is figurative, symbolic of fears 
and hopes, made of imagination and suggestions, not significant of a world of objective fact 
intellectually confronted.”19 While these means of explaining human existence were 
perceived as independent from truth, falsity, and rationality, Dewey at least considered them 
steps in the right directions towards philosophy proper in the sense that they helped to 
establish a certain shared social, emotional, and intellectual heritage from which a tribe or 
group of people’s thinking and perception of reality was shaped.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 John Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1938), 234.	  
19 John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1948), 7. 
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 Eventually, beginning with the sophistic movement in Greece and the emergence of 
philosophers such as Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, Dewey argues that “matter of fact 
knowledge increased to such bulk and scope that it came into conflict with not merely the 
detail but with the spirit and temper of traditional and imaginative belief.”20 This, according 
to Dewey, was the initial emergence and movement toward philosophy as we know it, with 
philosophy originally acting as a means of reconciling factual knowledge with religious, 
poetic, and imaginative views. It is known from the fate of Socrates that matter of fact 
knowledge at this time lost to the values of traditional belief, social esteem, and authority. 
While Dewey suggests that “tradition was noble in aim and scope,” he argues that it was 
“uncertain in foundation” and that “we must search out the reason of things, and not accept 
them from custom and political authority.”21 The account of Socrates’s life and death in 
Dewey’s history of philosophy illuminates the unfortunate end of a philosopher who left no 
traditional idea unchallenged, and whose philosophy presented potential reconstructive 
elements of reason and skepticism to which tradition and authority struck a reactionary 
deathblow. 
 The role and theme of classic philosophy then, beginning with Plato and Aristotle and 
continuing until Christian philosophy of Medieval Europe, was not to encourage philosophic 
behavior that was considered a danger to the body politic, but was rather to restore what had 
rested upon tradition and custom through “the very metaphysics of Being and the Universe,” 
which Dewey argued served as a “substitute for custom as the course and guarantor of higher 
moral and social values.” 22 It is at this point in Dewey’s history of philosophy that he notes 
the initial emergence of philosophy’s perceived ability to offer direction regarding higher 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Ibid., 13.	  
21 Ibid., 17. 
22 Ibid., 17. 
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moral and social values. The reconstruction of philosophy towards this end was ultimately 
Dewey’s aim, but Dewey saw that the Greeks lacked a valid and systematic logic of 
experimentation and inquiry that handicapped their means of philosophizing. Dewey 
explained that “the most generously imaginative soul of all philosophy could not far outrun 
the institutional practices of his people and his times,”23 and the institutional practices of this 
time that led to an invalid logic of inquiry stemmed from what Dewey called “a symptom of 
the leisure class disease.”24  
 Dewey goes on to suggest that the medieval mind “tended to look back to antiquity as 
the Golden Age of Knowledge…relying on sacred scriptures,” and he criticizes this 
reflection and reliance upon established knowledge and ways of thinking by saying that “any 
logic which identified the technique of knowing with demonstration of truths already 
possessed by the mind, blunts the spirit of investigation and confines the mind within the 
circle of traditional learning.”25 Where the medieval church succeeded, however, was in 
unifying theory and practice—a synthesis that Dewey saw as lacking in the history of 
philosophy until this point. While a synthesis of sorts was achieved between medieval theory 
and practice, with theory being the revealed will of God and practice being a hierarchical 
society ordered according to this will, this synthesis proved to be limiting and inadequate for 
Dewey who was critical of tradition and custom’s restrictive nature.  
 It was in the sixteenth and seventeenth century that custom and traditional beliefs 
clashed, and from their remains sprang new methods of philosophizing. Dewey writes that 
during this time, “the mind became used to exploration and discovery,” and that “it found a 
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delight and interest in the revelations of the novel and the unusual which it no longer took in 
what was old and customary.”26 It was the psychological change brought about during the 
age of European exploration and expansion, not just of the world, but also of the mind, that 
brought about what Dewey perceived to be the needed change in how humankind viewed 
science and philosophy. It is worth noting, however, that even though these more modern 
philosophers replaced the medieval period’s cosmic order with human nature to a significant 
extent, they failed by overcompensating with highly introspective philosophies that separated 
the mind from nature—the very separation that Dewey perceived as a shift in philosophy 
back towards the metaphysical and epistemological rather than toward the practical and 
human. 
 At this point in the history of philosophy, Dewey recognized that despite the rapid 
advances in the sciences and in the attainment of knowledge, philosophers were asking if 
knowledge was even possible. In an era of modernity ushered in by scientific, technological, 
and industrial revolutions, Dewey called for a reconstruction in and of philosophy—a 
reconstruction that would free philosophy from its ancient-medieval inheritance and worn-
out dualisms, and subsequently allow for a naturalistic, pragmatic, reflective, and critical 
theory of society, culture, and morals. 
 At the time when Dewey crafted this unique history of philosophy, humankind was 
faced with a number of questions, old ideas, habits, and predispositions that, as Dewey’s 
history of philosophy showed, could only be solved by replacing them with new questions 
and attitudes—specifically the new questions and attitudes brought about by the scientific 
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revolution, which, according to Dewey, “found its climax in the ‘Origin of Species.’”27 
Dewey’s writes that:  
The conceptions that had reigned in the philosophy of nature and knowledge for two 
thousand years, the conceptions that had become the familiar furniture of the mind, 
rested on the assumption of the superiority of the fixed and final; they rested upon 
treating change and origin as signs of defect and unreality.28 
 
Considering the fact that Dewey was born in 1859, the same year as the publication of 
Darwin’s Origin of Species, Dewey’s upbringing was subsequently in the years when the 
very nature of science, religion, politics, and social relations were changing as a result of 
Darwin’s biological findings and their implications. The treatment of change and origin as 
signs of defect would no longer be the philosophical norm, but rather Dewey’s history of 
philosophy reveals that traditional philosophy’s assumption of the fixed and final as superior 
was a significant logical flaw.  
 The role of Darwinism in Dewey’s philosophy is evident through his unremitting 
emphasis on the human race’s “growth to the realization of its own perfection.”29 The human 
species, if you will, is the only species conscious of its own existence and its ability to 
perfect its experience. If this process of perfection and growth is to take place, however, it is 
understandable that Dewey called for a reconstruction in philosophy towards solving 
society’s problems and perfecting human morals. If religion, custom, and tradition are 
anathema to scientific thought and solving societal ills in a scientific age, a reconstructed and 
more social philosophy is an understandable means of analyzing the human experience. 
 Dewey writes: “The influence of Darwin upon philosophy resides in his having 
conquered the phenomena of life for the principle of transition, and thereby freed the new 
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logic for application to mind and morals and life.”30 The influence of Darwin on philosophy 
ultimately led Dewey to reach a conclusion on his aim for a reconstruction in philosophy, 
which was reconstruction in a direction away from conjectural metaphysical inquiries and 
hyper-introspective philosophies that do not meet present needs, and rather towards a 
philosophical inquiry into the human condition in an attempt to better understand human 
affairs and morals—the very subjects for which science alone cannot provide answers. It is 
through the combination of philosophy and science’s systematic method of observation, 
theory of hypothesis, and experimental test that Dewey aimed to develop a pragmatic and 
naturalistic philosophy that would prove its worth through the active adaptation to ever-
changing human needs. 
 That being said, Dewey argued that it was the “construction of a moral human 
science” that would ultimately serve as “a needful precursor of reconstruction of the actual 
state of human life toward order and toward other conditions of a fuller life than man has yet 
enjoyed.”31 Dewey further explains that “one of the most immediate duties of philosophical 
reconstruction with respect to the development of viable instruments for inquiry into human 
and moral facts is to deal systematically with human processes.”32 And as is evident through 
an examination of Dewey’s history of philosophy, the human process most deserving of the 
systematic inquiry of the moral human science that is philosophy was history itself.  
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Philosophy of History 
 John Dewey’s history of philosophy is valuable in the sense that it allows oneself to 
better understand Dewey’s view of philosophy proper. It is also valuable in the sense that it 
allows one to understand Dewey’s philosophy of history and what Dewey perceived to be 
history’s inherent instrumental value. As noted, in a reflection upon his younger years, 
Dewey reveals that his exposure to the history of philosophy under the guidance of H.A.P 
Torrey, then Professor of Philosophy at the University of Vermont, played a vital role in 
what Dewey called “turning my thoughts definitely to the study of philosophy as a life 
pursuit.”33 Prior to Dewey’s time with Torrey, however, he writes with dissatisfied hindsight 
that the teaching and study of philosophy at the University of Vermont “had become 
restrained in tone” and had an “obvious tendency to rationalize the body of Christian 
theological doctrines.”34 It was not until Dewey was exposed to the instrumental value of a 
historical understanding of the progression and evolution of philosophical thought that 
philosophy became a worthwhile discipline that Dewey was willing to dedicate his life to 
pursuing.  
 The significance of history in Dewey’s thought is also present through his own 
history of philosophy (expounded upon previously) that he repeats without tiring throughout 
a number of his most notable works, including, but certainly not limited to, Reconstruction in 
Philosophy, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, and Democracy and Education. Through this 
repeated emphasis on the history of philosophy, one can see the value that John Dewey 
placed on the instrumental nature of history as a disciple for inquiry into the human 
condition. If a history of philosophy can, after all, be instrumental in the sense of shining 
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light on the areas in need of philosophical reconstruction, it is understandable that the history 
of humankind would appear to Dewey as a collection of past experiences worthy of scrutiny 
and inquiry for the sake of not only gaining a better understanding of current human 
circumstances, but also finding solutions to present human ills and experiences—allowing for 
the instrumentality of historical knowledge to aid in the progression and growth of intellect, 
morals, and society at large.  
 While knowledge—specifically historical knowledge—had a great deal of 
instrumental value to Dewey, this value became even greater when viewed through the lens 
of pragmatism—a school of thought that considers thought itself as a tool for problem 
solving and action that establishes truth and meaning in terms of the success of an idea’s use 
and practical application. Historical understanding was not to be static, but was rather 
instrumental in the sense that the findings of historical inquiry would serve some pragmatic, 
practical purpose. In the era of Dewey, those tired of metaphysical inquiries that did nothing 
to alleviate the ills of post industrial-scientific-technological revolution society refreshingly 
welcomed Dewey’s pragmatism. 
 As we know from Dewey’s perceived need for reconstruction in and of philosophy, 
he argued that: 
Problems and subject matter of philosophy grow out of stresses and strains in the 
community life in which a given form of philosophy arises, and that, accordingly, its 
specific problems vary with the changes in human life that are always going on and 
that at times constitute crisis and a turning point in human history.35  
 
In order for this reconstruction to take place, however, a philosophical and historical inquiry 
into ideological systems of the past was necessary to pinpoint the need for reconstruction in 
the present. While reconstruction in and of philosophy was overtly present in Dewey’s 
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writings, Dewey’s perceived need for a reconstruction in the philosophy of history is not self-
evident, but was rather a symptom of Dewey’s rejection of traditional empiricism and 
rationalism. In this sense, Dewey’s history of philosophy, and subsequently his philosophy of 
history, revealed his pragmatic historicism—a means of viewing the past that is as much 
philosophical as it is historical.  
 Put simply, Dewey’s view of history was that it is the process through which 
humankind had gained greater control of the world and perfected its desired experiences in 
the world in which it lived, and further, “the past is of logical necessity the past-of-the-
present, and the present is the-past-of-a-future-living present.”36 This view of the past, 
accordingly, leads Dewey to suggest that an “intelligent understanding of past history is to 
some extent a lever for moving the present into a certain kind of future.”37 In this sense, the 
practical instrumentality of an intelligent understanding of history is ultimately the means by 
which humankind can enhance the current human experience while also determining how to 
progress into futurity. This implies that the relevancy of the past is determined by present and 
future needs, that history is necessarily selective, and that historical inquiry is the means of 
extracting history’s instrumental value for pragmatic purposes aimed at guaranteeing 
progress and growth within the context of the human experience.  
 Most historians would agree that the past is in some way relevant to the present, but 
the problem that some historians have with Dewey’s philosophy of history is its implication 
that the facts of the past are only relevant to the inquiry prompted by present human 
experience and need. Phillip Deen, editor of Dewey’s Unmodern Philosophy and Modern 
Philosophy, explains that, “in good pragmatic fashion, ever-developing consequences change 
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the meaning of the original event. So our past depends on our image of the present and 
future.”38 This philosophy of history is problematic for some historians with a positivist 
worldview because it implies that history is not only necessarily selective, but also that the 
meaning of history is transient and that its certainty may be illusory.  
 Some historians, including Phillip Deen, argue that “all histories are selective” and 
that “this is not to say that history is whatever we make it, but that the historian is always 
swept forward by an evolving tradition in which the present leads us to alter what we take to 
be critical precedents.”39 Dewey himself stated that, “the notion that historical inquiry simply 
reinstates the events that once happened ‘as they actually happened’ is incredibly naïve,” and 
that history has a double meaning, with those meanings being “that which happened in the 
past” and “the intellectual reconstruction of these happenings at a subsequent time.”40 To be 
more clear, Dewey believed that the two elements that comprise this ‘double meaning’ of 
history are form and content, with form being the discipline of history itself (“the 
reconstruction of these happenings at a subsequent time”), and content being the findings of 
historical inquiry (“that which happened in the past”).  
 Further, and as is evident in Dewey’s history of philosophy, the chosen form of 
philosophy subsequently determines, to a significant extent, the content characteristic of that 
philosophy. Likewise, the form that the discipline of history takes directly determines the 
content or findings of the chosen historical method. As with Dewey’s inquiry into the history 
of philosophy that brought about the perceived need for reconstruction in and of philosophy, 
Dewey’s pragmatic historicism subsequently necessitated a restructuring of the discipline of 
history. In order to develop a historical understanding with any sort of instrumental value, 
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Dewey deemed it necessary to transform the form and discipline of history away from that of 
creating narrative accounts of the past and rather towards the process of inquiry and the 
application of experimental logic to the past in order to more fully understand the present and 
promote the progress and growth of the human race. 
 While Dewey’s perceived instrumental value of history has been emphasized, it has 
not been clarified that inquiry and instrumentalism are inextricably linked. The definition of 
instrumentalism itself entails inquiry, which can be seen through Dewey’s following 
argument:  
Instrumentalism means a behaviorist theory of thinking and knowing. It means that 
knowing is literally something which we do; that analysis is ultimately physical and 
active; that meaning in their logical quality are standpoints, attitudes, and methods of 
behaving toward facts, and that active experimentation is essential to verification.41 
 
 Following this mode of reasoning, history’s meaning and instrumental value are 
gained only through the act of “doing” history, which entails logical inquiry into and active 
experimentation with evidence from the past. If Dewey’s philosophy of history sounds 
scientific, that is because it is—at least in spirit. While Dewey writes that history is “to a very 
large extent concerned with establishing what happened at a given time and place,” and is not 
necessarily scientific in nature, he does argue that the big question is “whether or not the 
procedures employed by historians precluded from having scientific quality.”42 
 As with Dewey’s perceived need for a reconstruction of philosophy to aid in the 
betterment of the human race in a post-scientific age with pre-scientific morals, Dewey also 
perceived a need for a restructuring of historians’ procedures in order to utilize the richness 
of the past for the betterment of the race. By ‘procedures,’ Dewey is again referring to the 
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form of history—with the form, again, being that which determines the content of history. 
Dewey’s form of systematic historical inquiry provides a clear and logical historical method 
that is more fitting in a scientific age. Dewey argued that:  
Failure to institute logic based inclusively and exclusively upon the operations of 
inquiry has enormous cultural consequences. It encourages obscurantism; it promotes 
acceptance of beliefs formed before methods of inquiry had reached their present 
estate; and it tends to relegate scientific (that is, competent) methods of inquiry to a 
specialized technical field. Since scientific methods simply exhibit free intelligence 
operating in the best manner available at a given time, the cultural waste, confusion 
and distortion that results from the failure to use these methods, in all fields in 
connection with all problems, is incalculable.43 
 
 According to Dewey, the “incalculable” cost of failing to utilize a system of logic 
based on scientific methods of inquiry in the field of history would continue to result in a 
number of cultural and social consequences, with the largest being an obscure, unsound, and 
incomplete understanding of the past, which would subsequently result in a confused and 
distorted present. Lowell Nissen, professor and specialist of the philosophy of science, 
suggests that: 
John Dewey’s avowed intention in developing his account of inquiry was to make the 
methodology of science available to other disciplines, with particular interest in 
terminating the endless controversy in philosophy and in making it possible for the 
progress common in science, particularly physical science, to be shared by the studies 
of how man might better live. By applying the methodology of science he hoped to 
achieve both an intellectual victory, and a cultural and humanistic one.44 
 
 By applying the methodology of science to the discipline of history, Dewey’s 
ultimate aim was to achieve such an intellectual, cultural, and humanistic victory. It is now 
possible to reflect upon Dewey’s history of philosophy and its emphasis on the emergence of 
philosophical tendencies to synthesize the methodologies of scientific inquiry with sound 
logic to bring about intermittent intellectual, cultural, and humanistic victories over centuries 
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and millennia. The appeal of such victories to Dewey manifested itself in Dewey’s own 
philosophy of history, which hinged on logical inquiry into the past for the sake of bringing 
about sustained growth and progress in both philosophy and history to understand how 
humankind might better live. In terms of historical inquiry, Dewey’s historical method was 
primary concerned with social inquiry, as people are, after all, the subject matter of history. It 
was in John Dewey’s laboratory school at the University of Chicago that Dewey’s systematic 
method of historical inquiry and his human science that was philosophy would be put to the 
test to see if theory worked in practice. 
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The Dewey School 
 John Dewey’s history of philosophy and philosophy of history have been examined 
thus far, but what has not been examined is the application of Dewey’s philosophy of history 
within the curriculum and to the teaching of history itself at the Laboratory School. While 
Dewey was a philosopher in the truest sense, he was best known for his works in education, 
and being the pragmatist that he was, Dewey desired a means by which he could test his 
philosophical and psychological ideas through practical application. It was at the University 
of Chicago between 1896 and 1903 that the Laboratory School was opened and operated 
under the management of the University of Chicago’s Department of Philosophy, 
Psychology, and Education—a department headed by Dewey himself. Katherine Camp 
Mayhew, vice-principal and head of curriculum design at the Laboratory School, wrote that 
the school had two main purposes: “(1) to exhibit, test, verify, and criticize theoretical 
statements and principles; and (2) to add to the sum of facts and principles in its special 
line.”45 Without getting into the nuances of the specific psychological theories that were 
tested by Dewey and his colleagues, the aim of the theories being tested was “to discover and 
apply the principles that govern all human development that is truly educative, to utilize the 
methods by which mankind has collectively and progressively advanced in skill, 
understanding, and associated life.”46 In other words, Dewey and his colleagues were most 
interested in maximizing learning through a philosophy of education that was developed, 
corrected, and tested through practical application.  
 Combining educational theory and practice, however, proved to be difficult. In a 
statement written for the authors of The Dewey School, John Dewey wrote the following:  
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The practical difficulties of creating a new school as compared with the formulation 
of theoretical principles was recognized from the start. The idea of education as 
growth was new. Since growth is the characteristic of all life, education is all one 
with growing; it has no end beyond itself; it goes on during the whole life span of the 
individual; it is the result of the constant adjustment of the individual to his physical 
and social environment which is thus both used and modified to supply his needs and 
those of his social groups. All these new theoretical statements presented practical 
difficulties. There were no precedents for this type of schooling to follow, and there 
was need to study the growing child in relation to his environment and to experiment 
with subject-matter and method to find what ministered best to his growth.47 
 
 Despite the experimental nature of the Dewey School and the practical difficulties of 
putting theory into practice, the clear goal of optimizing intellectual and social growth both 
inside the school and throughout one’s life allowed for consistency and a clear direction for 
curriculum design. It is vital to understand that the aim of education at the Dewey School 
was what Jim Garrison, Stefan Neubert, and Kersten Reich, authors of John Dewey’s 
Philosophy of Education: An Introduction and Recontextualization for Our Times, call 
“growth through the reconstruction of experience,” with Dewey perceiving “growth” as the 
“functional development in the ability to discriminate our environment and respond more 
intelligently to it thereby transforming the world as we transform ourselves.”48  
 In order for this new educational design to take hold, however, a certain degree of 
reconstruction was needed. As was evident in Dewey’s history of philosophy and philosophy 
of history, and as argued in John Dewey’s Philosophy of Education, it is necessary to “judge 
institutions, customs, and habits according to their benefit for human growth and the solution 
of actual and relevant problems.”49 Dewey’s history of philosophy revealed the necessary 
judgment of past institutions of thought and custom in order to bring about a present-day 
reconstruction of the flawed aspects of those very institutions. Likewise, it was the institution 
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of traditional education that Dewey and his colleagues brought under scrutiny when 
designing and developing the curriculum of the Laboratory School—a curriculum that 
focused on the examination of past experience and practice through the discipline of history 
to see how past development and growth of the human race can aid in a better understanding 
of then-present problems while also encouraging further and continued growth and progress 
from childhood to adulthood.   
 Thomas Fallace, Associate Professor in the Department of Secondary and Middle 
School Education at William Paterson University presents Dewey’s perceived problem of 
education as “the problem of establishing vital connections between the immature child and 
the cultural and technical achievements of the adult life.”50 In regard to that problem of 
education, Dewey stated, “It is coming to be recognized that the historical method, more than 
any one thing is the key which unlocks difficulties.”51 It was the instrumental value of history 
that allowed for students to engage with the problems of the past as a means of not only 
reconstructing their understanding of past experiences, but to also serve as a vehicle through 
which students can study the growth, increased efficiency, and ability to intelligently respond 
to the circumstances of human existence.  
 As with how the subject matter of philosophy grows out of the strains and stresses of 
community life, the educational philosophy, the curriculum, and the actual study of history at 
the Laboratory School were designed with the then-present problem and social circumstances 
of industrialized society in mind. During a lecture on history in 1899, Dewey explained the 
following:  
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History is a double history. On one side it is an external social history, the history of 
industrial society reduced to its simplest elements, and as the industrial phase of 
society and industrial problems get more and more prominent, it is certain that 
industrial history is going to play a larger part as compared with the older political 
and dynastic history, or even with the newer type of history where more attention is 
paid to general social development…There is also a history of the intellectual 
development of man and thus is connected with the history of science. It gives us the 
evolution of practical intelligence, the evolution of intelligence as concretely used 
with reference to the problems of life and the environment, and the successive steps 
which have been taken to overcome the difficulties that present themselves, and in 
securing a continually better adaptation of means to ends, and also an increasing 
enlargement of the ends themselves.52 
 
 Through Dewey’s explanation, one can see the interconnected and organic nature of 
the Laboratory School’s curriculum that used the then-present problems of industrialized 
society to encourage social, intellectual, and scientific inquiry. The evolution of practical 
human intelligence and an understanding of industrial and social history were to be 
experienced by students through the indirect sociology of history that served as the curricular 
bedrock at the Dewey School, and while history was only taught directly for several hours 
per week, the historicist and genetic approach characteristic of Dewey’s thinking dictated 
how all other school subjects were taught.  
 In The Dewey School, Katherine Camp Mayhew and Anna Camp Edwards summarize 
the particulars of the history curriculum as follows: 
The children who had followed the regular work of the school had spent one year on 
social occupations, one on primitive life, one on explorations and discoveries, one on 
Chicago and the Virginia and Massachusetts Bay colonies, one on the union of the 
colonies and the Revolution, one half-year on American history from the European 
point of view, one half-year on the formation of the American Constitution, the 
acquisition of new territory in the westward expansion, and the industrial 
development up to 1830, and one year on history review in preparation for college 
board examinations or on Roman history. The average time the younger groups spent 
on history was two and one half hours a week; that of the older groups was one and 
one half hours a week.53 
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 Mayhew and Edward’s summary of the history curriculum provides a brief overview 
of the content of the curriculum, but it says very little about the method of teaching and 
learning history. In regard to the teaching and learning of history itself, and of course taking 
into account Dewey’s knowledge on constructing a developmentally appropriate curriculum, 
Thomas Fallace writes that, “history was one thing for the elementary school student, another 
thing for the secondary student, and yet another for the professional historian,”54 but that the 
approach to teaching and learning at the Laboratory School could be characterized as 
“repeating the race experience,” with “the race” being the human race. Repeating the race 
experience and the study of history was introduced to students at the Laboratory School as 
early as kindergarten, with the rationale being that “to understand any piece of knowledge 
and its relationship to an individual or society, one had to understand its history.”55 Katherine 
Camp Mayhew wrote that history “is a means of affording the child insight into social life,” 
and “is treated...not as a record of something which is past and gone, but as a way of 
realizing what enters into the make-up of society and how society has grown to be what it 
is.”56  
 This approach to repeating the race experience placed a significant emphasis on the 
social, intellectual, and industrial aspects of the past as students learned about developments 
in the cultivation of food, the construction of shelter and means of habitation, the 
development of clothing, and how the advancements and growth within these areas of life 
were tied directly to changes in the nature of occupations. In the Dewey School, history was 
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taught as “the story of man’s progress through invention, exploration, and discovery,”57 and 
while the Laboratory School was in no sense a vocational school, placing a significant 
emphasis on the changing nature of occupations played an integral role for students within 
their repeating of the race experience.  
 The reason for an emphasis on occupations is expressed in The Dewey School, where 
Katherine Camp Mayhew wrote that, “The main hypothesis was that life itself, especially 
those occupations and associations which serve man’s chief needs, should furnish the ground 
experience for the education of children,”58 and that “study in the sense of inquiry and its 
outcome in gathering and retention of information was to be an outgrowth of the pursuit of 
certain continuing or consecutive occupational activities.”59 The early occupational focus at 
the Dewey School was itself a means of not only getting student interested in the past, but it 
was also a means of allowing students to see how the past can provide insight to the present 
needs and circumstances of then-recently industrialized society.  
 Mayhew wrote that as elementary-age students repeated the past experiences of 
farmers, miners, woodsmen, cooks, garment makers, craftsmen, or artists, they “sprang with 
the nimbleness of childhood out of the present complicated and dimly understood ways of 
present-day living into the ultra simplicity of the past, with its few and crude ways of 
meeting the same primal needs.”60 It was the experiences of these students that convinced 
Mayhew and others at the Dewey School that the past was not dead to students, but that 
students “revived it by reliving it.”61 To further emphasize the perceived historical value of 
an occupational focus in the context of repeating the race experience, Katherine Camp 
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Mayhew stated that, “the history of work becomes the record of how man learned to think, to 
think to some effect, to transform the conditions of life so that life itself became a different 
and less tortured thing and gradually took on, for some at least, comfort and beauty.”62  
 While the teaching of history in the elementary grades and students’ subsequent 
initial experiences with repeating the race experience focused primarily on progressing 
through the states and stages of man’s development and growth, younger students did not 
take part in using history’s instrumental value to solve a specific problem or answer a 
specific question. Thomas Fallace writes that in the early grades at the Laboratory School, 
“an effective education required the individual to relearn the lessons of the race in a manner 
that corresponded with how this development originally took place”63 prior to students being 
developmentally prepared for the abstract thought and hypothetico-deductive reasoning 
required for the more rigorous and nuanced aspects of historical inquiry.  
 In the later elementary and secondary years at the Dewey School when students’ 
experience with repeating the race experience furnished an understanding of the growth and 
progression of the human race from primitive man to that of civilized man, history was then 
presented in a way that Mayhew calls “less empirical and more a matter of authentic record, 
so that the question of definite recall of what has been studied comes into the scheme.”64 An 
understanding of the evolutionary unfolding of past events and human experiences equipped 
students for the study of history proper. Students transitioned away from the method of 
reliving the race experience where they often answered how people of the past “might” have 
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addressed then-present problems and life circumstances, and rather began to focus on factual 
occurrences and why things happened the way that they did. 
 Even as students transitioned from repeating the race experience in younger grades to 
learning history in the more traditional sense from books and active experimentation with the 
historical method in the intermediate and secondary grades, the teaching of history was still 
that of an indirect sociology. Thomas Fallace writes that, “As the discipline of history (form) 
became more rigorous, the findings of the historical method (content) became more 
nuanced,”65 and even as the discipline and methodology of history became more rigorous and 
advanced, Dewey’s progressive philosophy of history elicited opposition and resistance from 
more conservative historians and educators who disliked Dewey’s reconstructed study of the 
past that served as an instrument within and a facet of the broader curricular classification of 
social studies. 
 While Dewey’s decision to teach history as an indirect sociology was done 
intentionally with the goal of encouraging students’ growth through the reconstruction of 
their understanding of the human experience, many historians are opposed to the notion of 
using history as a instrument for present uses or as anything that goes beyond perceiving and 
or studying the past simply and solely as that which happened in the past. This conservative 
philosophy of history can be seen in historian Patrick Kenney’s article “Social Studies, John 
Dewey, and the Erosion of History,” where he argues that “social studies” and Dewey’s 
approach to teaching history was “probably the most educationally devastating curricular 
innovation to emerge from the progressive movement. It undermines and impoverishes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Fallace, “John Dewey on History Education and the Historical Method,” 26.	  
	   35 
genuine historical understanding.”66 It was this notion of a “genuine historical 
understanding,” however, that was antagonistic to Dewey’s philosophy of history in the first 
place. 
 Recalling Dewey’s statement that “the notion that historical inquiry simply reinstates 
the events that once happened ‘as they actually happened’ is incredibly naïve,”67 one can see 
that the pragmatic application of Dewey’s philosophy of history was in fact not solely 
focused on that which happened in the past, but was rather aimed at encouraging student 
growth through their ability to intelligently reconstruct the past for a better understanding of 
the present and the future. As with how Dewey criticized philosophizing for the sake of 
philosophizing, he was likewise opposed to studying history for the sake of studying history. 
In Dewey’s mind, history played a central functional role in all facets of life—a functional 
role that many historians deem a fallacious belief.   
 For Dewey, the question of history’s potential intrinsic value was not of primary 
importance. What was of primary importance, and what is abundantly evident through an 
analysis of the implementation of Dewey’s philosophy of history at the Laboratory School 
was that history held an instrumentality for present purposes strong enough to shape the 
entire curriculum of the Dewey School around repeating the race experience. The act of 
repeating the race experiences was intended to encourage students’ lifelong growth through 
their ability to reconstruct their experiences from an intelligent understanding of past human 
growth and development. In this regard, Patrick Kenney is again critical of Dewey when he 
argues that Dewey’s educational philosophy and philosophy of history resulted in teachers 
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“focusing on methods and processes rather on substantive understandings. Consequently, the 
emphasis falls on developing generic skills, rather than on imparting subject matter.” 68 
 Kenney and other critics of Dewey could benefit from considering the aim of the 
Dewey School, which was not to produce professional historians, but was rather to cultivate 
the very “generic skills” that Kenney denounces. It was the skill of being able to understand 
past human growth and development and the skill of being able to reconstruct one’s own 
experience from that understanding that Dewey sought to instill within each one of his 
students. It was these very skills that would be of utmost importance for encouraging 
students to be critical, life-long learners that would help maintain the improve the democratic 
experience in America while also being better fit to face the unique life circumstances of 
living in a scientific and industrial age. And it was these skills that were progressive and 
ahead of their time, so far ahead of their time, in fact, that many educators are still attempting 
to understand and implement Dewey’s educational and historical practices more than a 
century after the doors to the University of Chicago’s Laboratory School closed in 1903. 
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Enduring Impact 
 The enduring impact of John Dewey’s life work is far-reaching and has influenced 
historians, educators, and philosophers both during Dewey’s lifetime and in the years 
following his passing in 1952. While Dewey has been incredibly influential as a philosopher, 
it is specifically his philosophy of education, the practical and experimental application of 
that philosophy of education at the Dewey School, and the publication of various written 
works relating to those topics that are likely the most well-known and influential aspects of 
John Dewey’s life work. While the reception of Dewey’s thought and life work has not been 
accepted whole heartedly and has been met with a great deal of resistance by some 
philosophers, educators, and historians, many individuals still turn to John Dewey for 
insights regarding his approach to education.  
 When examining the enduring impact of John Dewey’s thought and works, it is 
important to note that their reception depends largely on individuals’ interpretations. Authors 
of John Dewey’s Philosophy of Education argue that Dewey was “a holistic philosopher,” 
which subsequently “presents readers with a hermeneutic challenge.” As a result, they argue 
that readers “must grasp all of him to properly understand the parts, and yet must grasp the 
parts to comprehend the whole.”69 This is rather difficult to do, but the effort is necessary if 
one wishes to understand the meaning and aim of Dewey’s thought and works. For example, 
if one wishes to understand Dewey the educator, it is necessary to understand Dewey the 
philosopher, the psychologist, and the social critic. Those examining Dewey would also 
benefit from developing an understanding of Dewey’s perception of history, science, and 
culture, which all play a significant role in the unfolding of the active educational 
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experimentation and the writing of Dewey’s highly influential works during the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries.  
 Aside from understanding the many facets of John Dewey’s intellectual contributions 
to philosophy, psychology, history, politics, and education, one must also consider how the 
social and historical contexts of Dewey’s time affected the varied reception of his ideas. 
Dewey’s ideas were developed and tested in dramatically changing times, and as we know 
from Dewey’s own philosophical arguments, the content of Dewey’s intellectual 
contributions was determined, in large, by the novel and ever-changing circumstances of his 
then-present existence. Dewey’s philosophy and theories emerged during the times of 
uncertainty and change characteristic of industrializing society, of a world attempting to 
receive Charles Darwin’s findings published in On the Origin of Species, and of a nation 
attempting to maintain its democratic experience in the wake of a civil war, two world wars, 
and severe economic recessions and depressions. 
 While many turn to Dewey for guidance and insight in the present day, those who 
experienced the initial emergence of Dewey’s unique means of philosophizing, perceiving 
the past, and educating students exhibited mixed reactions to Dewey’s thought and works. 
Historian Patrick Kenney is particularly critical of Dewey’s influence on education and the 
study of history. He suggests that “while pragmatism sought to revitalize American 
Liberalism, it is ultimately destructive in civic culture, in that it dissolves national bonds, and 
denies any notion of a shared, collective history that is meaningful to individuals.” 70 The 
manifestation of Dewey’s pragmatism and its characteristic ability to embrace change, origin, 
and the unknown for the sake of progress while also perceiving that which is fixed and final 
as a logical flaw proved to be unsettling to more traditionalist and positivist historians and 
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educators. In an age of unrest and uncertainty prompted by rapid change and a series of 
devastating national and global conflicts, Dewey’s tendency to present history’s meaning as 
transient and its certainty as illusory was unsettling in already uncertain times.  
 A shared, collective history was, and still is, meaningful to many individuals. What 
was most meaningful to Dewey, however, was not the ability to hold on tightly to a shared 
nationalistic history. Dewey sought to selectively view and reconstruct the past with the 
intent of applying history’s practical instrumentality to solving and understanding then-
present problems. Rather than seeking to maintain the established and traditional ideologies 
of the time for the sake of a sense of unity and certainty amongst the populace, Dewey sought 
to embrace a new ideology that would encourage potentially uncomfortable growth as 
opposed to comfortable ideological and societal stagnation.  
 In the years following Dewey’s passing there were similar instances of mixed 
reactions and instances of resistance to Dewey’s thought and its implications for established 
and popular ideologies. The authors of John Dewey’s Philosophy of Education explain the 
reception of Dewey’s thought as follows: 
In the decades since his death in 1952, his influence waned in both philosophy and 
education because of the dominance of analytic philosophy (especially in the United 
States) and the turn in psychology and education first to narrow behavioristic and 
then to more cognitive approaches both of which underestimated the significance of 
experience and culture for education.71 
 
 It is evident that the mixed and waning reception of Dewey’s thought and works both 
during his lifetime and in the decades following his death was and is due to a number of 
social, political, and ideological factors. As aforementioned, the social conditions of the time 
were not conducive to the widespread adoption and application of Dewey’s pragmatism 
within the realm of education and specifically within the discipline of history, but that is not 
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to say that Dewey’s works were unpopular or that that did not spark a great deal of interest 
and curiosity.  
 Even when the societal and intellectual temper of Dewey’s time would not allow for a 
whole-hearted acceptance of Dewey’s pragmatism, experimental logic, philosophy of history, 
or educational practices, his works were far enough ahead of their time to elicit curiosity and 
interest to the present day. The world has changed to a significant degree since the 
experimental application of Dewey’s philosophy of education at the Dewey School and the 
publication of numerous volumes on philosophy, psychology, and education in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and as a result, the more recent reception of 
Dewey’s thought has been more open-minded and reflective while also being less emotional 
and reactive. 
 One of the largest hindrances to the reception of Dewey’s thought both during and 
after his lifetime appeared to be that of the unwillingness to embrace change and uncertainty 
due to what many intellectuals perceived to be a loss of culture and the destruction of a 
shared history. What modern intellectuals are beginning to realize to a greater extent is that 
certain aspects of Dewey’s thoughts are actually conducive to promoting a sense of shared 
culture and history. This shared culture and history, however, is not one of a fixed and static 
interpretation of the past, but is rather a history of social, cultural, and intellectual growth and 
progression made possible by shared experiences. Jim Garrison, Stefan Neubert, and Kersten 
Reich write the following in regard to the role of experience and culture in Dewey’s thought: 
Dewey’s theory of experience represents an important cultural turn in philosophy and 
provides a perspective of knowledge as an instrument in culture. In experience, we 
find a lot of cultural tools and resources that we can use in thinking and acting to 
creatively shape our world.72  
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 Rather than knowledge threatening culture, Garrison, Neubert, and Reich argue that 
the knowledge attained from experience can be an instrument in culture. Dewey desired a 
time in which the knowledge attained from human experience could be used to shape the 
world to be that which humankind desires. It is in this present age and its culture of 
knowledge, if you will, that the growth of matter of fact knowledge and the subsequent 
change in individuals’ perceptions of their past, present, and future can be used to bring 
about a culture of growth and progression.  
 The emphasis on experience as a means of gaining knowledge is a characteristic of 
Dewey’s educational philosophy with which many educators are familiar, and with which an 
increasing number of educators are beginning to turn. As with during the era of progressive 
education, an increasing number of teachers, parents, and students are presently growing 
tired of what education has become. Garrison, Neubert, and Reich explain the reality of the 
current condition of the education system when they write that, “today’s educational 
researchers and practitioners attempt to reduce pedagogy to rules, regulations, and empty 
rituals, which seek to maximize PISA (Programme for International Student Assessment) 
scores as if the human mind and self was merely an array of numbers,”73 which is just a 
partial depiction of what leads to the unimaginative rote learning and memorization that takes 
place in far too many classrooms.  
 Dewey opposed memorization and rote learning. He favored inquiry, higher order 
thinking, and experiential learning that encouraged sustainable and lifelong learning practices 
as opposed to short-term “cramming” that is characteristic of performance-oriented learning. 
Further, the aim of the Dewey School, and the aim of educators who deem Dewey 
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increasingly relevant in an era of standardization and teaching to the test, is to help student 
learn how to learn and how to learn most efficiently.  
 In hopes of maximizing student learning, a current educational practice that many 
teachers are attempting to get away from is the excessive use of textbooks in the classroom. 
There have been numerous books written about the detrimental effects of using textbooks as 
the primary means of conveying information to students. Works such as Beverlee Jobrack’s 
Tyranny of the Textbook: An Insider Exposes How Educational Materials Undermine 
Reforms and James W. Loewen’s Lies My Teacher Told Me: Everything Your American 
History Textbook Got Wrong are just a couple of educational texts that, while published with 
the hopes of garnering headlines and attention, reveal how textbooks can misguide students 
with factually inaccurate or incomplete information. These texts also note that textbooks are 
often times not based on research about how students actually learn, and they often hinder 
rather than promote student achievement.  
 While some educators remain ignorant to the shortcomings of textbooks, Dewey 
understood these shortcomings over a century ago. In Eugene F. Provenzo Jr.’s “History as 
Experiment: The Role of the Laboratory School in the Development of John Dewey’s 
Philosophy of History,” he writes that “Textbooks were rarely used in history classes at the 
Laboratory School, since it was felt that they failed to provide classes sufficient insight into 
the types of problems the children were asked to consider,”74 and that “Dewey’s problematic 
approach to teaching history encouraged the use of primary source materials, which, of 
course, were rarely included in the textbooks of the period.”75 Primary sources are, to some 
degree, often included in twenty-first-century textbooks along with activities designed to get 
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students to examine those sources, but that is not to say that the primary sources are always 
used to encourage historical inquiry and higher order thinking—especially in instances when 
teachers defer to allowing a textbook’s linear and somewhat authoritative interpretation of 
the past to do the teaching for them. 
 Fortunately, there are many educators and associations who aim to encourage 
systematic historical inquiry within history and social studies classrooms. Within the last few 
years, the National Council for the Social Studies has put forth The College, Career, and 
Civic Life (C3) Framework for Social Studies State Standards, which is the result of 
collaboration among fifteen professional organizations “committed to the advancement of 
social studies education.”76 While there is debate over whether or not state standards should 
be used, the C3 Framework works with Common Core standards to encourage inquiry and 
higher order thinking within the disciplines of civics, economics, geography, and history. 
 The C3 Framework’s “Inquiry Arc” is what appears to be the primary means of 
improving the practical implementation of Common Core state standards in history and 
social studies classrooms. The inquiry arc consists of “four Dimensions of informed inquiry,” 
which strongly resembles the scientific method—an experimental method of inquiry with 
which Dewey was an advocate. The application of this systematic and somewhat scientific 
means of inquiry to the discipline of history and the social sciences seems to provide the 
skills, tools, and methods of disciplined thinking that are needed “in order to traverse 
successfully the worlds of college, career, and civic life.”77  
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 While some historians may oppose a framework that not only appears to be modeled 
after the scientific method, but also is one that requires significant inquiry into and the use of 
the social sciences, educators should recall Dewey’s emphasis on applying the methodology 
of science to history and human science in order to secure what he called an intellectual, 
cultural, and humanistic victory. Dewey would have only considered the C3 Framework as a 
step towards this humanistic victory if it helped students learn to learn and encouraged them 
to be lifelong learners who continually grew from their ability to reason in a systematic and 
holistic way similar to that advocated by the C3 Framework. If used properly by teachers, the 
C3 Framework has the potential to teach students the historical skills of systematic inquiry 
that the student can then utilize throughout their entire life as they try to make sense of past, 
present, and future human experiences. 
 There are, of course many other educational initiatives that emphasize historical 
inquiry aside from the C3 Framework. For example, Stanford History Educational Group is 
primarily interested in conducting research related to issues of how history is taught and 
learned. Websites such as Teachinghistory.org provide teachers with engaging teaching 
materials, history content that goes beyond the textbook, and information on educational best 
practices related to historical thinking and analyzing primary sources. There are also a 
number of educational programs and resources put forth by the American Historical 
Association that encourage the study of history “to gain access to the laboratory of human 
experience.”78 The present day consideration of the history discipline as a “laboratory of 
human experience” sound remarkably Deweyan, as do the various educational initiatives 
mentioned with their emphasis on historical inquiry and higher order thinking. While Dewey 
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is not directly cited in many present-day educational initiatives, it is safe to say that the spirit 
of Dewey is alive and well within numerous current educational reforms efforts that perceive 
history and the social studies as disciplines worthy of inquiry for the sake of better 
understanding present human experiences. 
 While Dewey has had many other enduring impacts that are simply not mentioned 
here, the enduring impacts mentioned have given a glimpse into the far-reaching effects of 
Dewey’s philosophical and educational works. Dewey’s insights are valued in this present 
age when educators and professional organizations seek to maximize student learning and 
student achievement. Even if educators are unable to escape the binding nature of standards 
and the pressure of high-stakes testing, they can still turn to Dewey for insights on how to 
encourage student growth both in the classroom and in the real world.   
 The word “experience” resounds within the mind of educators who truly desire to 
teach their students something worthwhile and relevant to the real world and real life 
experiences, but the notion of learning through experience is not enough. Teachers must 
understand Dewey’s aim of growth and how history’s practical instrumentality can help 
promote the aim of continued and lifelong growth through the reconstruction of students’ 
experience if they are to achieve the humanistic victory of making the attainment of 
knowledge a natural process that is itself a deeply ingrained facet of a rich, productive, and 
progressive culture.  
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Conclusion 
 While this exploration of John Dewey’s philosophical and educational thought has 
been by no means exhaustive, at this point it should be evident that Dewey’s intellectual 
contributions were interconnected and manifested themselves both in his published works 
and though practical and experimental application. Dewey’s pragmatism was a powerful 
shaping force that influenced all aspects of his thought. It determined how he perceived the 
history of philosophy, developed his own unique pragmatic historicism, and tested his 
diverse theories through practical and experimental application at the Laboratory School. 
Dewey’s pragmatism and its emphasis on unifying theory and practice with the aim of 
continued growth through the reconstruction of past, present, and future human experiences 
gives value and credibility to Dewey’s thinking. Ultimately, these efforts established Dewey 
as a philosopher whose theories and practices are as valuable in the present day as they were 
over a century ago. 
 It is the reconstructive aspect of Dewey’s philosophy that makes it timeless, 
adaptable, and applicable to the ever-changing circumstances of human existence. The 
reconstructive aspect of Dewey’s thinking presents itself most clearly in his history of 
philosophy, which reveals the reconstructive and subsequently instrumental nature of 
Dewey’s philosophy of history. Further, understanding this revealed philosophy of history is 
vital if one desires to understand the curriculum design of the Dewey School, which hinged 
on repeating the race experience in order to foster within students a deep understanding of 
past human growth and development while also encouraging historical inquiry and active 
problem solving.  
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 We are reminded in John Dewey’s Philosophy of Education that, “what does not 
reconstruct itself will eventually undergo destruction,”79 and it is the nature of Dewey’s 
philosophy of education and philosophy of history that allow for continued reconstruction 
dependent on ever-changing present needs and experiences. Going forward, we should 
remind ourselves of the necessity of continually reconstructing of our experience to bring 
about lifelong learning and lifelong growth. 
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